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NIGHT OF THE LIVING DEAD HAND: THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND THE
ZOMBIE CONSTITUTION
Gary Lawson*
INTRODUCTION
If someone had told me on June 27, 2012, that five Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court were about to hold in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius1 (NFIB) that the individual mandate provision in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act2 (PPACA) was not
constitutionally authorized either by the Commerce Clause or the Necessary
and Proper Clause,3 I would have popped a cork. I don’t even drink, but I
would have popped the cork on principle just to hear the sound (and also to
irritate my colleagues, most of whom revere the PPACA the way that cargo
cultists revere airstrips4). I would have thought it obvious that such a
holding would entail invalidation of the mandate; and while that would not
necessarily have rid the world of the statute in its entirety, absent five solid
votes for nonseverability, it would have been—as the old joke says of
10,000 lawyers at the bottom of the Atlantic—a good start.
Of course, I would have been wrong on pretty much every possible level
(except in believing that invalidation of the mandate would have been a
* Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified primarily in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Section 1501(b) of the PPACA mandates that “[a]n
applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual,
and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under
minimum essential [health insurance] coverage for such month” or else face a monetary
“penalty.” § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b)(1)).
There are exceptions for prisoners and some members of narrowly defined religious
communities. § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 246 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)–(4)).
The criteria for “minimum essential coverage” are defined in section 1501(b), 124 Stat. at
248 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)).
3. If one judges by founding-era usage, the correct name for Article I, Section 8, Clause
18 of the Constitution is the Sweeping Clause. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause,
43 DUKE L.J. 267, 270 (1993). But because this Essay discusses a Supreme Court opinion
that uses the (incorrect) modern label, I reluctantly defer to modernity’s error and call it the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
4. Is the cargo cult comparison unkind to supporters of the PPACA? Perhaps, though I
am still waiting for someone to explain, without invoking magical thinking, how the PPACA
will increase the supply of medical services.
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good start, but that is a topic for another paper). Halfway through Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion, the mandate was essentially pronounced dead.
But like young Victor reviving the deceased Frankenweenie, Chief Justice
Roberts resurrected the mandate from the grave by calling it an indirect tax.
The operation was successful, but the patient unfortunately lived.
The decision’s doctrinal consequences are difficult to gauge. First, the
holding that the individual mandate was constitutionally justifiable under
Congress’s taxing power gives a very broad interpretation to the concept of
an indirect tax, but it is hard to see where that will lead in future cases.
Second, although the Supreme Court upheld most of the Act, it
invalidated—by a 7–2 vote—the provisions that would have forced states
dramatically to expand their Medicaid benefits. If the goal of supporters of
the PPACA was to increase in a substantial way the number of persons
nominally covered by some form of health insurance, Medicaid expansion
was a critical vehicle for achieving that goal, and it has now lost at least
some of its wheels. Both in the long and short term, that may be NFIB’s
most consequential holding.5 Third, the holding that neither the Commerce
Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause (nor the two in combination)
could justify the mandate6 may or may not survive the next vacancy on the
Supreme Court, so future predictions of doctrinal development are
treacherous at best.
Accordingly, I will focus only on the present and discuss “The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly” aspects of the Court’s holdings on the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses, on the assumption that they represent good
doctrine at least for the moment.7 The “good” is that the Court, for the first
time in nearly two centuries, explicitly recognized that one of the central
requirements of legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause is that it
must be “incidental” to some principal enumerated power. This is an
enormously important development that is entirely correct as a matter of
5. For an analysis of the Medicaid holding and its possible consequences, see Nicole
Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties:
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 1 (2013).
6. A number of sore winners persist in maintaining that the Court’s decisions on the
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause were dicta, because Chief Justice
Roberts decided the case on other grounds. But Chief Justice Roberts made it inescapably
clear that the mandate could only be considered a tax if it could not be sustained as a
regulatory penalty. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01. That is, if the Commerce Clause
and/or Necessary and Proper Clause could sustain the mandate, then Chief Justice Roberts
would have interpreted it as a regulatory penalty, which it most naturally appears to be. He
would only consider it to be a tax once a very strong doctrine of constitutional avoidance
kicked into play, and that avoidance doctrine needed holdings on the Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause as triggers. In Chief Justice Roberts’s eyes, the mandate
literally did not become a tax, capable of being sustained by the taxing power, until he had
finished his analysis of the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause. This
reasoning may well be spectacularly silly, and even unconstitutional, see infra Conclusion,
but it is not dicta.
7. I will touch only in passing on the decisive holding regarding the federal taxing
power.
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original meaning. The “bad” is that the Court spent much of its energy
discussing the Commerce Clause, which, in a rational world, could not be
invoked as support for the mandate with a straight face. While the Court
avoided adopting an even sillier interpretation of the Commerce Clause
than modern law has already generated, it missed an excellent opportunity
to clarify the respective roles of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause in the constitutional structure. The “ugly” was the string
of propositions that the Court took for granted as starting points for analysis
regarding federal power. Those propositions depart so far from any
plausible understanding of the Constitution that it is a mistake in principle
to describe the activity in which the Court was engaged as constitutional
interpretation. Something was being interpreted, but that something was
not the actual Constitution. Instead, it was a soulless shadow of the real
document: a zombie constitution. Of course, that zombie constitution
replaced the real one a long time ago (so perhaps Invasion of the Body
Snatchers would have been a more apt reference); NFIB breaks no new
ground on that score. But the decision does highlight, if highlighting is
necessary, the irrelevance of the actual Constitution to modern governance.
I. THE GOOD: THE OBAMACARE INCIDENT
The individual mandate was defended in the Supreme Court8 on three
separate grounds: as a valid exercise of Congress’s power (1) to “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States”; (2) to enact laws “necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution” other federal powers, such as the
commerce power; and (3) to “lay . . . Taxes.”9 Although the Court upheld
the mandate on the third ground, from an interpretative standpoint the most
noteworthy discussion concerned the second ground. Five Justices, in two
separate opinions, concluded that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not
provide constitutional authorization for the mandate. Both opinions
advance important propositions about the Necessary and Proper Clause.10
8. This is not to say that it could not be, or was not, defended on other grounds. For
example, it would be difficult, and probably counterproductive, to try to pigeonhole Sotirios
Barber’s defense of the PPACA, grounded on a teleological understanding of the
Constitution, into one of the three clause-bound arguments made to the Court. See SOTIRIOS
A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES’ RIGHTS 24–29 (2012).
9. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578–79.
10. Given the conventions of the legal academy, and my own general rejection of those
conventions, I should note that I do not regard an idea’s appearance in a Supreme Court
decision as evidence either for or against its merit. The Constitution means whatever it
means, and the Supreme Court, as with anyone else, can either acknowledge or fail to
acknowledge that meaning. There is no particular reason, either theoretical or empirical, to
think that it will be any better at discerning that meaning than anyone else—and considerable
reason to think that it will be worse in many contexts. Furthermore, to celebrate a correct
idea’s recognition by the Supreme Court presupposes that it is a good thing for the Supreme
Court to recognize correct interpretations of the Constitution. That may seem trivially true,
but hopefully a moment’s reflection will show that such a claim can responsibly be defended
only after elaboration of a foundationally sound moral theory that yields adjudicative fidelity
to the Constitution as a derivative conclusion—and that is far from trivial. Consider this
Essay a piece of legal anthropology that simply observes, with contingent interest, the
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The joint opinion for Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito (joint
opinion) contained a brief but powerful discussion of the Clause. After
determining that the Commerce Clause could not justify the mandate—a
determination about which I will say more in Part II—the joint opinion
noted that “the Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will
help achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce.”11
This conclusion followed a discussion of four prior cases, the first two of
which—New York v. United States12 and Printz v. United States13—
involved regulation of states and the second two of which—United States v.
Lopez14 and United States v. Morrison15—involved regulation of private
activity. The opinion then observed that “the last two of these cases show
that the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause is exceeded not only
when the congressional action directly violates the sovereignty of the States
but also when it violates the background principle of enumerated (and
hence limited) federal power.”16
While the opinion is a bit cryptic, a straightforward meaning emerges
when one reflects on what it means to say that the Necessary and Proper
Clause reflects “background principle[s].” In Printz, the Court rejected the
idea that the Necessary and Proper Clause could allow Congress to
commandeer state officials to execute federal law because “[w]hen a ‘La[w]
. . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle
of state sovereignty . . . , it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into
Execution the Commerce Clause.’”17 In support, the opinion cited a law
review article that carefully, and one might even say eloquently,18
explained how the word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause
incorporates background principles of separation of powers, federalism, and
the rights of citizens as limits on the extent of the powers granted to
Congress under the Clause.19 It is not enough for a law under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to have an appropriate causal connection to
effectuating an enumerated federal power.20 The Clause requires such laws
Supreme Court’s recognition of certain constitutional truths and its utter failure to notice
others, without attempting to ascribe normative weight to that recognition.
11. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646.
12. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
13. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
14. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
15. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
16. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646.
17. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (emphasis in original).
18. Of course, one might be less inclined to say this if one were not the article’s
coauthor, but never mind.
19. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 3.
20. What is that appropriate causal connection? Modern law appears to say “rational
basis.” See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–57 (2010); Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004). As usual, modern law is wildly wrong. See Gary Lawson,
Discretion As Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 242–48 (2005) (arguing that “necessary” describes a causal
connection stronger than rational basis but weaker than strict indispensability).
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to be both “necessary” and “proper,” in the conjunctive, and the best
understanding of “proper” is that it incorporates basic fiduciary norms,
including the norm that agents (in this case Congress) must stay within the
reasonable confines of their delegated authority.21 Those confines are
determined as much by the nature and structure of the grants of power as by
explicit limitations on the agent. Printz was an eminently correct
recognition of this basic feature of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Until NFIB, the only instances in which the Court expressly applied this
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause involved direct
regulation of states or state officials, as Justice Ginsburg accurately noted in
her opinion for four Justices.22 The joint opinion makes clear that at least
four Justices do not see the word “proper” as limiting the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause only when some notion of “state sovereignty”
is at issue. Rather, a “proper” law must conform to all principles that
define the appropriate reach of federal power. While Lopez and Morrison
did not expressly invoke this reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
the joint opinion clarifies that such a reading was implicit in and underlies
those decisions.
Or so at least four Justices think. What about Chief Justice Roberts? The
Chief Justice’s separate opinion agreed with the joint opinion that, “[e]ven
if the individual mandate is ‘necessary’ to the [PPACA’s] insurance
reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a ‘proper’ means for
making those reforms effective,”23 because laws under the Necessary and
Proper Clause are not “proper” when those laws “undermine the structure of
government established by the Constitution.”24 That makes five Justices
who got it right.
But Chief Justice Roberts got something else right that is even more
fundamental than the limiting role played in the Constitution by the
requirement that executory laws be “proper.” At the outset of his
discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Roberts laid
out some general principles that guide interpretation of the Clause:
The power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” the powers enumerated in the Constitution, Art.
I, § 8, cl. 18, vests Congress with authority to enact provisions “incidental
to the [enumerated] power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise.”
Although the Clause gives Congress authority to “legislate on that vast
mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,” it

21. For more on the fiduciary roots of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see infra pp.
1705–06.
22. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
23. Id. at 2592.
24. Id.
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does not license the exercise of any “great substantive and independent
power[s]” beyond those specifically enumerated.25

This is strange-sounding language to modern ears. What does it mean to
speak of a “great substantive and independent power” that is beyond the
compass of the Necessary and Proper Clause? And what is an “incidental”
power? When is an exercise of authority “incidental” to some enumerated
power?
It is in some respects sobering that this language is largely unfamiliar in
modern times, because it was crucial to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland, from which it is drawn. McCulloch is presumably
taught in every Constitutional Law course, so how could this language and
its significance escape notice? Nonetheless, escape notice it has. Indeed,
the present author is moderately ashamed to admit that he did not
understand the import of this language until a few short years ago, when it
was made clear to him by Robert Natelson, who to my knowledge is the
only modern scholar who has truly understood the role of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in the constitutional design.26
Fortunately, Mr. Natelson was available to coauthor a brief in NFIB that
pointed out to the Court this language’s importance.27 Recall that
McCulloch involved the constitutionality of federal incorporation of a
national bank, in the absence of express constitutional provisions
authorizing either federal banks or federal corporations.28 The enduring
legacy of McCulloch is its discussion of the meaning of the word
“necessary,” in which the Court rejected the strict Jeffersonian construction
of the term in favor of some looser construction.29 (Whether that looser
construction was or was not the Hamiltonian “rational basis” test of modern
law is a topic for another time.) But before engaging in that discussion,
Chief Justice Marshall devoted seven pages to what he recognized was a
25. Id. at 2591 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411, 418, 421 (1819)).
26. And I say that as someone who has spent much of his professional life studying the
Necessary and Proper Clause. I think I managed to blunder into some right answers along
the way, but without Rob Natelson’s insights, first laid out systematically in Robert G.
Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 243 (2004), I would have missed the most central feature of the Clause. I do, however,
give myself credit for being a fast learner. See Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News
for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate,
121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1025.pdf.
27. See Brief of Authors of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Gary
Lawson, Robert G. Natelson & Guy Seidman) and the Independence Institute As Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents (Minimum Coverage Provision), Dep’t. of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. Feb. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 484061. Chief Justice
Roberts did not cite this brief, in keeping with his general reluctance to cite secondary
literature. We (meaning the authors of the brief) would like to think that it provided the
inspiration for his discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, but we may never know.
It is hard to believe, however, that by sheer coincidence Chief Justice Roberts independently
rediscovered the principal/incident language from McCulloch just as we filed the brief.
28. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 318–19 (1819).
29. Id. at 322–26.
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question preliminary to a discussion of causal necessity: whether
establishment of a federal corporation was properly an incident to any of the
enumerated powers.30 As Marshall explained, incorporation was “not, like
the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a
great substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as
incidental to other powers.”31 Rather, incorporation of a bank “must be
considered as a means not less usual, not of higher dignity, not more
requiring a particular specification than other means.”32 Therefore the
power of incorporation may “pass as incidental to those powers which are
expressly given, if it be a direct mode of executing them.”33
The key to this passage is understanding that the Necessary and Proper
Clause is an expression of basic principles of agency law, well understood
by the framing public (and particularly by the agency lawyers on the
Committee of Detail who drafted the Clause). Any agency instrument will
grant certain powers to the agent. Because it is difficult or costly to specify
every possible contingency that can arise, it is sensible to construe agency
instruments, unless otherwise specified by the drafters, to allow the agent to
exercise powers that regularly accompany, or are incidental to, the
specifically enumerated, or principal, powers granted by the instrument.
For example, an agent’s power to enter into contracts might well include,
depending on the context and the custom in the trade, the power to extend
credit to the purchaser on behalf of the principal, even if the agency
instrument makes no mention of credit sales. Eighteenth-century agency
law so held. But these implications of ancillary, or incidental, powers have
limits; the agent with authority to enter contracts might be able to imply a
power to extend credit if that was customary among such agents, but it
would be a very different matter to imply a power to sell the principal’s
entire business—even for a good price. The power to sell the business is
surely a principal power in that context, meaning that one would expect it to
be specifically enumerated in the agency instrument if it existed. It would
not be an ordinary accompaniment, or incident, of the agent’s power to sell
goods.
By the late eighteenth century, there was a thick body of law governing
what kinds of powers in various contexts were properly incidents to the
powers of an agent. These understandings could, of course, be altered,
abolished, or codified by the parties in the drafting of their instruments. If
one wanted an instrument in which the agent had broader incidental powers
than the background law would provide, one could draft an “implied
powers” clause that would suggest broader-than-background authority. Or
one could negate any inference of incidental powers by specifying that the
agent had only those powers expressly granted. Or one could essentially
codify the background norms by providing that agents may exercise all
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 405–11.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 411.
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“necessary,” “proper,” or (most restrictively of all within the range of
background conventions) “necessary and proper” powers to execute the
granted powers.
Robert Natelson has demonstrated—beyond a reasonable doubt, I will
unhesitatingly aver—that the Necessary and Proper Clause was precisely
such an “implied powers” clause drawn from these principles of agency
law.34 Accordingly, Congress (the agent) has only those unexpressed,
unenumerated powers that are incident to the specified, or principal,
enumerated powers. Importantly, status as an incident is a precondition for
a power’s inclusion under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which status
must be established before one asks whether the power is somehow causally
related to the execution of some enumerated power. If the exercised power
is really a principal rather than incidental power, then it cannot come within
the Necessary and Proper Clause no matter how causally efficacious it
might be. That is why Chief Justice Marshall, after determining that the
power of incorporation was incidental rather than principal, concluded that
incorporation could “pass as incidental to those powers which are expressly
given, if it be a direct mode of executing them.”35 The requirement that the
power be an incident was in addition to the requirement that it be a direct
mode of (“necessary” for) effectuating the principal (“expressly given”)
powers.
In the context of the individual mandate, this means that a threshold
question, before one asks whether the law is “necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” some enumerated power, is whether the power
represented by the mandate is incidental or principal. If it is the latter, then
Congress cannot exercise such a power without a constitutional amendment
adding it to the express, principal powers of Congress. The power to order
people to buy products (and to buy them from government-approved
monopolists in the bargain) is at worst arguably, and at most blindingly
obviously, a principal power, of at least equal “dignity” (as eighteenthcentury agency law described the principal/incident inquiry) to the express
powers of the national government. Chief Justice Roberts accordingly
concluded that the mandate could not be “‘incidental’ to the exercise of the
commerce power. Rather, such a conception of the Necessary and Proper
Clause would work a substantial expansion of federal authority.”36
The short-term consequence of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is to
bring to the forefront the agency-law origins of the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the importance of determining, as a threshold matter, whether
any claimed exercise of congressional authority under that Clause seeks to
exercise a principal rather than incidental power. This is not a new idea; it
34. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, in GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN,
THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52 (2010); Robert G. Natelson, The
Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in LAWSON ET AL., supra, at 84.
35. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
36. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418)).
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was the foundation for the opinion in McCulloch. But it is an incredibly
important idea that was in danger of getting lost. The long-term
consequence is to stimulate consideration of the many ways in which
agency law can inform understanding of the Constitution, beyond the
narrow confines of the PPACA. Time will tell if that turns out to be Chief
Justice Roberts’s most important contribution to American jurisprudence.
II. THE BAD: MISSED IT BY THAT MUCH
Putting together Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the four-Justice joint
opinion, NFIB represents the high-water mark in modern jurisprudence37 in
recognizing the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
decisions, alas, did not fare so well with respect to the Commerce Clause.
It is true that Chief Justice Roberts and the four authors of the joint opinion
rejected the claim that the Commerce Clause could authorize the mandate,
and that is certainly correct as a matter of original meaning. But they
missed an opportunity to clarify modern law in a conceptually important
way, and it is unlikely that a better opportunity will arise in the near future.
What failed to happen is, in the long run, probably more important than
what happened.
The individual mandate compels virtually all Americans to purchase
government-approved health insurance or pay a fine.38 The Commerce
Clause gives Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.”39 It took both Chief Justice Roberts and the joint opinion a fair
amount of time and effort, and a discussion of a great many past decisions,
to reach the conclusion that the Commerce Clause does not provide
constitutional authority for the mandate. With all due respect, this is a
conclusion that does not require much in the way of either effort or thought.
The mandate makes it unlawful to sit in your living room (perhaps
contemplating your navel or watching paint dry) while uninsured. There is
no linguistically defensible way to describe this as a regulation of
“Commerce . . . among the several States.” Sitting in your living room is
not commerce—not among states, with foreign nations, with Indian tribes,
or even with your bridge club. If someone honestly, truly believes that
sitting in your living room is actually “Commerce” as that word is used in
the Constitution,40 I genuinely do not know what to say to them—just as I
37. To be sure, that is somewhat like talking about the high-water mark in the Gobi
Desert, but one takes what one can get.
38. It is a fine. It does not become a tax instead of a fine simply because the Supreme
Court calls it one, no more than the word “proper” imposes a jurisdictional limitation on
Congress simply because the Supreme Court says that it does. Reality is objective; its
existence does not depend on some Berkeleyan perception by the Supreme Court.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
40. The qualifying phrase “as that word is used in the Constitution” is vital. It is
possible to come up with meanings for the word “commerce” that encompass all human
activity, and even all human inactivity. It is much harder to say that those meanings found
their way into Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of a late-eighteenth-century legal document. See
Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to
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would not know what to say to someone who honestly, truly believes that
growing plants in your kitchen window is commerce. There are times when
argument is not worth the effort.
To be sure, sitting in your living room uninsured (or growing plants in
your kitchen window) might well affect commerce among the several states
(or with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes) in some fashion, however
remote. But the Commerce Clause does not give Congress power to
regulate matters that affect commerce (remotely or otherwise); it gives
Congress power to regulate (some forms of) commerce. If the subject
matter being regulated is not commerce, it does not come within the Clause.
Activities that are not commerce but that affect commerce are not
commerce; they are activities that affect commerce but are not commerce.
At the risk of offending someone, and perhaps a great many someones: this
is so simple a point that it requires a willful act to miss it.
That is not to say that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to
regulate activities that are not themselves commerce but that affect
commerce. It is only to say that the Commerce Clause cannot, with a
straight face, be put forward as the source of that authority. As it happens,
there is a clause in the Constitution that seems well suited to addressing the
things-that-are-not-commerce-but-which-might-affect-commerce situation.
Congress is given power to make “all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,”41 including the
power to regulate commerce among the several states. If a power to
regulate something other than interstate commerce is (1) incidental to that
power and (2) necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution,
then the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to regulate that
noninterstate-commerce-but-interstate-commerce-affecting activity. But
the constitutional analysis must center on the Necessary and Proper Clause,
not the Commerce Clause.
Modern law, of course, has lost this elementary understanding. Cases
routinely describe as part of the commerce power itself the ability to
regulate matters that have a “substantial effect”42 on interstate commerce.43
This is just sloppy thinking (and writing) that skips an essential step in the
analysis: Congress may well be able to regulate noninterstate-commerce
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, but only under the
Necessary and Proper Clause (and consistent with all of the limitations on
the scope of the power granted by that Clause), not under the Commerce

Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55 (2010), http://www.michigan
lawreview.org/assets/fi/109/natelsonkopel.pdf; see also Robert G. Natelson, The Legal
Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789 (2006).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
42. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941). This is not to say that the
decision in Darby committed this error. It committed many other errors, but not this one.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
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Clause itself. I have made this point at length elsewhere44 and will not
belabor it here.
This confusion is certainly not new to NFIB, but the individual mandate
presented such a clear illustration of the absurdity of trying to treat as
“commerce . . . among the several States” activities (and I am treating
sitting in your living room watching paint dry as an activity) that simply
cannot be jackhammered into that conceptual category. It is hard to
imagine a more appropriate case in which to clear up this particular
confusion. It is a bit depressing that no one, not even Justice Scalia,45
thought to mention it.
III. THE UGLY: RESIDENT EVIL
The individual mandate is actually a rather modest piece of the larger
PPACA. Indeed, the mandate is a means for implementing some of the
statute’s broader provisions; no one, to my knowledge, views the mandate
as a desirable end in itself. Rather, the mandate is a response to some
consequences of the PPACA’s regulation of the insurance market, which in
its most basic form specifies the minimum content of health insurance
policies, forbids insurers from denying coverage to persons with preexisting conditions, and forbids most price differentiation among persons
who present varying risk profiles.46 Another major chunk of the PPACA
involves spending large amounts of money, either as grants to states for
Medicaid services or to private individuals to subsidize their purchase of
health insurance.
No one in NFIB challenged the constitutional authority of Congress to
regulate the terms and content of private insurance contracts. Nor did
anyone challenge the basic constitutional propriety of Medicaid as a
spending program or the federal subsidization of private purchases of health
insurance—though of course there were (successful) challenges to some
provisions compelling states to expand their Medicaid programs or lose all
federal funding. Congress’s powers to regulate insurance and to transfer
wealth from some citizens to others as an end in itself unconnected to the
implementation of some enumerated federal power were simply taken for
granted. Those matters have been deemed settled since the New Deal,47
44. See Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, The PPACA in Wonderland, 38 AM J. L. &
MED. 269, 281–84 (2012).
45. At other times, Justice Scalia has recognized the appropriate role of the Necessary
and Proper Clause in this kind of analysis. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–35 (2005)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
46. In other words, it essentially forbids insurance from functioning as insurance and
instead turns it into a privately administered welfare program. A detailed account of the
PPACA’s insurance regulations, and a detailed defense of my characterization of those
provisions, would require a separate article, which I am quite sure will never get written.
47. On congressional power to regulate insurance, see United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). On congressional power to spend without
reference to the implementation of enumerated powers, see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
77–78 (1936), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
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and they were the foundation upon which all of the opinions and arguments
in NFIB were fashioned.
Of course, Congress has no such powers under the Constitution. The
formation and terms of an insurance contract are not remotely matters
within the reach of the Commerce Clause, as the Supreme Court recognized
for a century and a half before the New Deal.48 Nor does Congress have an
unlimited power to spend money, without reference to whether the spending
carries into execution some enumerated power. The Constitution’s only
“spending clause” is in fact the Necessary and Proper Clause, which
requires that any appropriation law be “necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution” some enumerated federal power.49 The vast bulk of the
PPACA is, if anything, more flagrantly unconstitutional than the individual
mandate. But the debate over the mandate took place in a legal world in
which a taxing clause becomes a spending clause and the formation of a
contract is interstate commerce. This is not a legal world governed by the
U.S. Constitution.
The point is simple but profound: when the Supreme Court was deciding
on the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Commerce Clause,
and the Taxing Clause in NFIB, it was not actually interpreting the U.S.
Constitution. It was interpreting a document that bears some facial
resemblance to the U.S. Constitution but that functions as a completely
different instrument. The specific clauses at issue in NFIB do not have
meanings in the abstract. They have meanings in the context of a particular
document. If one put the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause in an
Olive Garden menu, it would not necessarily bear the same meaning that it
has in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution of 1788; in the
former case, for example, it would not be obvious that the clause was
drawing its meaning from background principles of agency law. Once one
has abandoned the Constitution on such fundamental matters as the federal
spending power and the scope of interstate commerce (and these are just
two of the countless matters on which modern law deviates so far from
original meaning that it makes no sense to describe the relevant ascription

48. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868). For detailed accounts of
why South-Eastern Underwriters is egregiously wrong as a matter of original meaning, see
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 585–86 (2010); Robert G.
Natelson & David B. Kopel, “Health Laws of Every Description”: John Marshall’s Ruling
on a Federal Health Care Law, 12 ENGAGE 49, 50–51 (2011); Rob Natelson & David Kopel,
Health Insurance Is Not “Commerce,” NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.law.com/
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202487886015.
49. For detailed accounts of why the federal spending power is located in the Necessary
and Proper Clause rather than (as modern law would have it) in a clause that grants only the
power to tax, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE:
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION & AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 24–32 (2004), and Jeffrey T. Renz,
What Spending Clause? (Or the President’s Paramour): An Examination of the Views of
Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1999).
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of meaning to the resulting instrument as “constitutional interpretation”),
one might as well be “interpreting” the Olive Garden menu.
Indeed, such interpretation would be far less prone to the fallacy of
equivocation, in which one surreptitiously (and perhaps unthinkingly)
substitutes the real Constitution for the instrument actually being interpreted
in the premise or conclusion of an argument. This is a serious risk because,
as noted above, the instrument that is the object of interpretation bears some
vague, cursory resemblance to the actual Constitution. But in reality, it is a
shadow, or zombie form, of the actual Constitution. It takes the external
appearance, or body, of the Constitution, but with the Constitution’s actual
meaning drained from that body. Like a zombie, this faux Constitution
shambles onward, eating people’s brains whenever it can get past their
defenses, while utterly lacking the soul (that is, the meaning) that defines
the actual Constitution.
This is not something unique to NFIB. The entirety of modern
constitutional jurisprudence consists of treating a zombie constitution as
though it were the real deal. Nor is it a new point; I made the same
observation two decades ago.50 At the time, I had nothing much to offer
beyond the observation, and I have nothing better today. But the shared
premises of all of the parties and all of the Justices in NFIB bring home
with clarity that almost no one today engages in real constitutional
interpretation. That does not mean that the vast bulk of academics, and the
entire legal profession and judiciary, are not engaged in important and
interesting activities. From the standpoint of political theory, either
normative or descriptive, those activities are far more interesting and
important than interpreting the Constitution. It does not even mean that
those persons are not engaged in some kind of interpretation of some kind
of “constitution”; the interpretation of a zombie constitution is most
assuredly a species of constitutional interpretation. It just means that they
are not interpreting the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
One final note while we are on the subject of “ugly.” Chief Justice
Roberts upheld the mandate only because he construed it to be a tax
(specifically an indirect tax that required no apportionment among the
states) and was therefore authorized by the taxing power.
That

50. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1253 (1994):
It makes no sense to agonize over the correct application of, for example, the
Appointments Clause, the Exceptions Clause, or even the First Amendment when
principles as basic to the Constitution as enumerated powers and nondelegation are
no longer considered part of the interpretative order. What is left of the
Constitution after excision of its structural provisions, however interesting it may
be as a matter of normative political theory, simply is not the Constitution.
Id.
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construction, in turn, was driven by his belief that only such a construction
of the law could save its constitutionality. He explained:
. . . [T]he statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance
than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution
allowed it. It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize
such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question.
And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if
fairly possible, that [the mandate] can be interpreted as a tax. Without
deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would find no basis to adopt
such a saving construction.51

The point of this discussion was to make it clear why he felt it necessary to
address the Commerce Clause (and the Necessary and Proper Clause) even
though he was ultimately upholding the mandate on the basis of the taxing
power.
As I read this passage, Chief Justice Roberts looked at the statute and
saw a command and a penalty for violating that command—as did the four
Justices in the joint opinion52 and as did I.53 He concluded that such a
command/penalty was unconstitutional—as did the four Justices in the joint
opinion and as did I. He therefore re-read the statute, in a fashion that by
his own lights does not represent its most plausible reading, as a tax, which
he could then uphold.
Let us assume that Chief Justice Roberts was right about the mandate
being constitutional if it was construed as a tax.54 Is there any escape from
the conclusion that Chief Justice Roberts just “upheld” a statute that, by his
own lights, Congress did not enact? To be sure, there is nothing unusual or
unprecedented about the interpretative move made by Chief Justice Roberts.
To the contrary, the avoidance canon, even in this statute-altering guise,55 is
a well-recognized principle of interpretation.56 But that does not change its
effect, which is to “uphold” a law that was not actually enacted. So framed,
application of this canon blatantly violates the Constitution’s lawmaking
provisions57 and exceeds the scope of the “judicial Power.”58

51. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012).
52. See id. at 2650–55.
53. See Lawson & Kopel, supra note 44, at 278–79.
54. I do not think he was right about that, see id. at 279–80, but it is a hard question
about which I am far less certain than I am about the other matters discussed in this Essay. I
certainly would not say mean things about someone who maintains that the mandate, if
properly considered a tax, is constitutional—especially if they have thought about the matter
more carefully than I have.
55. Alternative versions of the avoidance canon would say to prefer an interpretation
that does not raise constitutional questions to a comparably plausible interpretation that does
raise such questions, see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 247–51 (2012), or to resolve cases on nonconstitutional
grounds where possible. See id. at 251.
56. Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and
the Individual Mandate , 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717–20 (2013).
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 1–2.
58. Id. art. III, § 1.
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Perhaps there is a way to understand the application of this particular
interpretative device that does not involve the substitution of a new statute
for the one that was actually enacted. It is no proof against that possibility
that I do not see it. But I do not see it.

